Wednesday, August 26, 2015

Lecture 4 : Sociology of the Crisis & the Loneliness of the Masses




1. In a social climate of intensified social conflict and growing human casualties, hostility and frustration was easily displaced onto political institutions and apparently influential minorities like the Jews. Both the parties and the nation-state were on the defensive. The state was no longer able to maintain its position above parties and was, increasingly, pressured to take sides and come between struggling parties. This only aggravated popular distrust of the status quo. It increasingly became easier for the disaffected to organise large strata of people outside the party system. This mass was the completely disillusioned, who believed their interests no longer defended and who no longer viewed the state as the impartial symbol of the interests of all (OT262).

2. At this point we can introduce some of the sociological characters who play a large role in Arendt’s diagnosis of the crisis of modernity in the Origins of Totalitarianism: these are the bourgeoisie, the mob and the intellectual elite and the masses. It is worthwhile pointing out that these are not strictly empirical portraits. Her sociological figures are ideal types rather than accurate empirical configurations. For instance she makes no attempt to explore the various graduations of the bourgeoisie or to differentiate between the bourgeoisies in different European states.

3. Arendt's whole story of 19th century European history is played out against the background of bourgeois society. The French Revolution emancipated the bourgeoisie class: it is the representative of new dynamic expansionary forces. Yet, Arendt has no love for the bourgeoisie. This class is orientated to private interest and accumulation while its increasing social and political hegemony had seen the decline of citizenship. In its early phase, the bourgeoisie had fulfilled an important (albeit still exploitative) socially productive function. However, transformed into big capital towards the end of the 19th century seeking profits without production, the bourgeoisie itself became socially surplus and parasitical (OT150). Imperialist policies in the late 19th century saw the needs of capital accumulation and class greed take priority over the real interests of the nation-state with no concern for its fragile limits. The increasing victory of the bourgeois over the citoyen distorts politics.

4. The social strata Arendt identifies as the "mob" plays the role of catalyst of extremism within the deteriorating dynamics of bourgeois society. The mob is in her words "the refuse of all classes". This strata is an inseparable by-product of bourgeois society. As we will see Arendt also identifies a deep spiritual identity between the two. Even large-scale beggary has been endemic throughout the early modern period as a consequence of the ex-appropriation of the peasantry. However, Arendt draws a qualitative distinction between these pre-modern victims and the modern phenomenon of the mob. Unlike the "beggars" and "rabble" of the past, the mob is not the issue of particular tragic events or changed governmental policies but a systemic residue of the competitive mechanisms and resulting social dislocation of bourgeois society. I have already mentioned that as the bourgeois economy reached the limits of its domestic expansion one of its products was human surplus in the form of unemployment. The mob is to be distinguished both from the growing industrial working class (by the fact that it is neither a single class nor does it work) and the people as a whole (because its interests are particular and not common). Like Marx's proletariat, Arendt's mob is social strata outside of bourgeois class society and deprived of its benefits. The difference is that the mob is not even potentially a class for itself but, as Arendt says, "the refuse of all classes". This diverse origin generated the impression that the mob was somehow beyond the divisions of class society and a more pure representative of the people while its permanent exclusion from class society provided it with a set of institutions on which it could vent its frustrations and hatred. They are not only unemployed but they also constitute a quasi-criminal element in bourgeois society.

5. This underclass is characterised by an essential irresponsibility. This is the deeper sense in which the mob is an inseparable by-product of bourgeois society. Alliance between the bourgeoisie and the mob is the genesis of every consistently imperialist policy (OT155). The basis of this alliance is the fact that capitalists (the much-too-rich) need the political support of the mob (the much-too-poor) in order to pressure the bourgeois nation-state to support imperialist ventures. At the same time, the mob view this support opportunistically as a prospect of quick riches or at least enjoying some of the spoils generated by a wealthy imperialism. But the affinity between capital and mob is deeper than just a temporary political alliance. Crises and depressions that precede imperialism embolden the bourgeoisie to abandon its moral hypocrisy. The original primitive accumulation of capital was a product of the ex-appropriation of the peasantry. For a long time this original criminal act was thought merely an isolated "sin" subsequently superseded by harmony and equilibrium produced by automatic market mechanisms and reinforced by sound bourgeois morality (OT156). However, what was really involved was the moral revolution captured in Hobbes’ harrowing vision of an anti-social, atomised, competitive and egoistic bourgeois man. This vision now becomes reality. Bourgeois expansion requires new crimes abroad to feed its inexhaustible appetite. What unites capital and the mob is the absolute bourgeois principle of self-interest built on a shared priority of greed. Ultimately the bourgeoisie must acknowledge this kinship and the brutal "truths" long openly espoused by the mob. It is little wonder that Arendt finds in the mob a potential backing for a despotism that challenges democracy. This is the group from which the pan-Germanic and Slavic nationalist movements and eventually the Nazis will draw their leadership.

6. Another sociological actor in this great historical drama was the European intellectual elite. It played a vital role in the decline of morality. Here Arendt speaks with the authority of a participant and a deep empathy for the spirit of the milieu. A remarkable number of distinguished intellectuals were sympathizers, fellow travelers and totalitarian party members. In what consists this attraction of the totalitarian movements for intellectuals? Clearly the elite shared a structural affinity with the mob. Both these strata existed on the margins of bourgeois society and were outside the class and nation-state system of respectability and “good society”. But more than marginality, the intellectuals also shared the mob's cynicism regarding the hypocrisy of bourgeois values. They were contemptuous of a society "wholly permeated with the ideological outlook and moral standards of the bourgeoisie" (OT328). They wanted to see the radical transformation of a life consumed in competition, bourgeois material comfort, triviality and fakeness. Arendt recalls that many intellectuals greeted the First World War joyously as an opportunity for purification and self-sacrifice. For the post war generation this desire had intensified into a hymn for the total destruction and ruin of this society. Their enthusiasm was not cured by the real horrors of the war. Rather this experience was cherished as a prelude to the collapse of the old bourgeois world and the creation of a new order forged in death and authentic equality and justice (OT329). War obliterated all spurious identifications with origins and predetermined functions. Unlike the early generation of imperialism that had been able to escape into the wider world of exotic lands, the war generation was drawn to more radical solutions. Surrounded by social chaos and entrapped in the daily routines of a bourgeois life without meaning, they were attracted to activism and violence. The totalitarian movements of the twenties offered an outlet for both in the form of an activism which escaped the bourgeois world while the passionate selflessness could be sated in identification with overwhelming historical forces (OT331) i.e. classes, races

7. The worsening economic and social conditions of Europe in the inter-war period provided the historico-sociological foundation of the group Arendt terms the "masses". The late 19th century mob was the first wave of déclassé individuals stemming from the early crisis of the bourgeois economy. It is characterised not just by unemployment but also a criminal and lawless element derived from inverted bourgeois standards. As Arendt explains, between the wars this déclassé group was swelled by more unemployed, by refugees and displaced populations of minority nationals, by ex-appropriated small property owners and former members of the middle and upper classes, victims of post-war dislocation and inflation. The volume of these causalities exemplified the complete breakdown of the European class system. These individuals were torn from former class expectations and found no representation in a party system based on class interests they no longer shared and saw increasingly as illusory and fraudulent. For Arendt the clearest symptom of this collapse was the inability of the parties to recruit new members from the younger generation and the loss of the support of the great mass of neutral apolitical individual. This vast social group formerly believed that the parties existed to protect their interests: now they turn elsewhere seeking another means of expressing their political opposition and disillusionment (OT315):

The fall of protecting class walls transformed the slumbering majorities behind all parties into one great unorganised, structureless mass of furious individuals who had nothing in common except their vague apprehension that the hopes of party members were doomed ... (OT315).

This gives rise to a terrifying new "negative solidarity": these individuals were no longer held together by class interests nor any other positive bond at all, only a shared dissatisfaction. Arendt underlines that this collective dissatisfaction constituted not only a great potential threat to existing political structures and institutions. Even more importantly, it becomes the source of real conformism because one of the most acute experiences of the masses is that of atomisation and loneliness (OT316).

8. Why does Arendt believe that life in the masses is atomized and lonely? One of the features of bourgeois life is its aggressive competition and the orientation of individual away from the duties of the citizen towards particular interests of private existence and capital accumulation. Remember Arendt's thesis that class membership had kept the atomising potential of bourgeois relations in check by providing economic forms of common interest and solidarity to replace the disappearing community relations of traditional society. However, with the crisis and final collapse of the class system in the twenties, a process of intensified social fragmentation asserts itself. Here Arendt's analysis becomes psychological and speculative. According to her, bourgeois individualism has an important bearing on the psychology of mass man in the 20th century. Despite the uniformity of fate of all those individuals who were victims of the inter-war years of social and economic turmoil, this did not stop them judging themselves in terms of individual failure and specific injustice (OT315). The generality of the fate did nothing to alleviate self-centred bitterness. These individuals had no common interests of an economic, social or political kind and consequently suffered in isolation. However, the paradoxical result-- and as you will note Arendt loves to formulate such paradoxes-- was that this self-centredness ‘went hand in hand with a decisive weakening of the instinct of self-preservation’ (OT315). Thus, the phenomenon of surplus, which had been a product of the economic and social processes of bourgeois society, was now internalised into the very psyche of the mass individual. Each felt they did not matter and were expendable. This overriding sense of personal failure registered in the loss of a secure lifeworld simply destroys the ego. The mass individual loses interest in their own well-being. This loss of ego strength-- which is also evident in other theories of the mass psychology of fascism like that of the Frankfurt School's totally administered society-- manifests itself in a peculiar selflessness. The individual is willing to fanatically subordinate his/herself to a movement or a supra-individual task. Yet this selflessness is not the product of individual idealism but of a radical loss of self-interest; it stems not from individual decision but from the individual's embeddedness within a movement that is the manifestation of total conformism (OT307).

9. As we will see, the totalitarian movements are anti-bourgeois not just because they reject bourgeois individualism but because they supposed that mass organisation could extinguish individual identity permanently (OT314). The crux of Arendt's theory is that the extreme individuality of bourgeois society finally implodes, destroying the ego and leaving the mass individual a hollow and disorientated vessel especially prone both to conformist behaviour and to the rigid dogmas of totalitarian ideology. We cannot conclude from Arendt's analysis that the concept of the masses applies only to the growing strata of casualties or victims of the processes of European reconstruction after the First World War. While it certainly includes them, Arendt primarily wants to give the concept of the masses a political connotation. Bourgeois society engenders not only the collapse of traditional communal bonds but also an anti-political disinterest and apathy regarding public affairs and civic duty. Arendt makes it clear that her notion of the masses incorporates not just the large numbers of bitter, displaced and disorientated individuals but also all those who felt themselves outside the institutions of political representation. She continues:

The term masses applies only where we deal with people who either because of their sheer numbers, or indifference, or a combination of both, cannot be integrated into any organisation based on common interest, into political parties or municipal governments or professional organisations or trade unions. Potentially, they exist in every country and form the majority of those large numbers of neutral, politically indifferent people who never join a party and hardly ever go to the polls (OT311).

10. It is now apparent that the masses are not just the human refuse of bourgeois society in the phase of its imperialist escapades but even the great majorities in all the advanced Western countries who may not be casualties of bourgeois economic and political processes in the ordinary sense of being unemployed, disenfranchised or stateless. These individuals are nevertheless "superfluous" in another important sense. Large numbers and social chaos simply defy effective articulated organisation: the masses lack collective interests and no longer have any active participatory relationship to the institutions that shape their own fate. Arendt is not saying that indifference to public affairs or political neutrality is the "cause" of totalitarian movements. However, the privatized interest and public apathy generated by the bourgeois lifeworld makes a decisive contribution toward the erosion of structures, which underwrite individual personality. This was the vital precondition for enrolment in the cohorts of totalitarianism (OT313).

11. The individual of mass society presupposed the conformism that was a product of the final internal collapse of bourgeois individuality. For Arendt, the final product of bourgeoisification and the proper representative of mass society is the "philistine". The philistine epitomises individual retreat into private self-interest: committed exclusively to private existence, the "philistine" is primarily a jobholder and good family man. This singular devotion to career and love ones lead to complete impotence. In the face of the collapse of his world, all the philistine can think of is private security. He is willing to sacrifice anything for it- including belief, honor and dignity (OT338). This exclusive focus on private life allowed ordinary individuals to ignore the persecution and political crimes they witnessed without raising a finger. Commitment to career and duty also allowed the family man to participate in the machinery of the death camps and mass crime without overt complaint. The exclusive interest in private security lends the behaviour of the philistine a compliant predictability making them dependable cogs in the organisation of mass domination and death. This conformism of mass society marked the final internal collapse of bourgeois individuality. In Arendt's account of the historical emergence of the masses there are two elements. Firstly, she outlines the historical crisis of bourgeois society, its surpluses and casualties. Simultaneously, she presents a deeper sociological/ philosophical analysis that stresses the ultimate logic of bourgeois attitudes. The increasing apolitical attitude and focus on private life. Arendt clearly believed that the impact of the bourgeois processes of modernity account for both and ultimately produce the psychology of mass man.

12. Arendt is not the first theorist to warn of the potential dangers of mass society. What distinguishes her theory is the extent to which she places atomisation at the heart of mass society. Already in the early19th century de Tocqueville had draw attention to the atomisation of modern democratic mass society. For him, one consequence of the combined disappearance of a feudal social hierarchy and the bourgeois emphasis on the individual was a homogenisation of lifestyles and weakening of communal ties. But in Tocqueville's account the emphasis falls on the dangers of an exclusive preoccupation with "equality" and the social processes of equalisation. The great threat of mass society is that it will produce a world of sameness where the lack of social diversity gives rise to the potential tyranny of the majority. Arendt takes up another theme in Tocqueville. In this reading the mass individual is not a consequence of growing equality nor of the lowering of standards that follow from the general spread of education but from the crisis of extreme bourgeois individualism. This brings about an ego destroying social atomization that hollows out the individual leaving them vulnerable to social conformism. As she puts it ”The philistine is a bourgeois isolated from his own class”(OT338). The ultimate danger remains the same: a disappearance of individuality and the domination of conformism. However, in Arendt's historical context of historical crisis and political extremism, it does not take the form of a relatively ”benign” tyranny of the democratic masses. It now assumes the far more radical shape of a projects aimed at the destruction of civilisation and the radical transformation of human nature.

13. Arendt considers loneliness to be paradigmatic condition of the mass individual. Such loneliness even in the crowd had become an everyday experience of the ever growing masses (OT478). I want to dwell a little on this notion of the loneliness of modern mass society. This is a vital link to Arendt's later thinking. Her account of its historical emergence is only fragmentary but the main outline is quite clear. Extreme bourgeois individualism loosens the old communal bonds and turns the individual away from common interest through competition and a preoccupation with private interest. In the crisis of the inter-war epoch, these effects were compounded by the further disorientating consequences of social dislocation--mass unemployment, financial ruin, homelessness, uprootedness and statelessness. Such compounding produces intensified feelings of impotence and superfluousness. The result was a lifeworld of frightening insecurity and accidentality. In this environment the individual was completely thrown back on himself. They had to psychologically absorb the impact of this social chaos and feeling of self-responsibility for their own position. Arendt makes it clear that for many the result was profound disorientation and loss of ego strength.

14. In her accompanying essay "Ideology and Terror: A New Form of Government" (1953) which was only added to the second edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1958, she provides the philosophical foundations of her account of loneliness. She maintains that ‘human beings need the constant transformation of chaotic and accidental conditions into a man-made pattern of relative consistency (OT352)’. The pre-condition of such a transformation of human experience from chaos to relative consistency is the social processes of inter-subjective confirmation of individual experience. This is the bedrock of the constitution of both the self and common sense. Even our experience of the sensuously and materially given world presupposes others who confirm our experience and reinforce our common sense. To the extent that we are liberated from enclosure in the particularity of our own sense data we can trust our senses (OT 475). Of course, this is also an argument for the barrenness of the classical early modern epistemological model. In her model, social experience as intersubjectivity plays the decisive role in the confirmation of knowledge and it is not surprising to find that Arendt’s ideas have found contemporary exponents like Habermas.

15. Arendt maintains that in the inter-war period, a rapidly increasing number of individuals were deprived of the inter-subjectively confirmed social existence that reinforced common sense and self-identity. In enumerating some of the characteristics of the individuals drawn to the totalitarian movements, Arendt mentions, amongst other things, that the movements represented "those masses that were no longer willing to live in any kind of structure, regardless of its nature"(OT398). The mass personality is characterised by adaptability, conformism and absence of continuity (OT306). This reflects not flexibility but ego weakness and the disorientation of lost structure. Social dislocation, homelessness and alienation from institutional structures of bourgeois politics and the nation-state had made it impossible for them to be at home in the existing world. I have already mentioned the fact that the collapse of protective class walls in this epoch destroyed the idea of common interests constituting the mass as a multitude of unstructured individual interests. Interest as a collective force depends upon the existence of stable social bodies that provide the necessary transition belts between individual and group. They represent proportionate strengths, facilitate formation of opinions and allow for the determination of specific goals. Yet precisely these were missing in the epoch of social dislocation, unemployment and homelessness. For Arendt, this provides an explanation of one of the most puzzling features of totalitarianism. She finds its 'radical departure from the strictly utilitarian concerns of other mainstream political movements to be grounded in the fact that the masses have drifted away from a concern with mere interests' (OT347). The masses wanted victory and success but this was a quite abstract desire without regard to specific common class articulated interests and not expressed in limited and obtainable goals (OT31O). Allegiance to the leadership was to the person and not based on any special collective interests (OT350). In another place Arendt comments that the unconditional loyalty demanded by the totalitarian movements of its individual members was of a degree only to be expected of completely isolated individuals who had no other ties and could only derive their sense of place in the world from the completely contrived and artificial world of the movement (OT323). (She follows this up by arguing that such total loyalty is only possible when it is emptied of any concrete content in terms of aims and goals (OT323). Open-ended, total loyalty corresponded to the weakened self of the disorientated mass individual who could only find a substitute self-definition and self-importance from the externally offered sources of totalitarian ideology like anti-Semitism. Here at least the masses find a negative point of identification, self-definition and stability (OT356). In Arendt's eyes what characterises the mass individual is not brutality nor backwardness but the lack of normal social relationships. (OT317). The psychic impact of lack of stability, ego weakness, constant insecurity and distrust of all existing political and social structures is evident in the masses’ disbelief in anything visible and their pronounced preference for the mysterious. Although totalitarian propaganda so often clashed with common sense, this was not as politically debilitating for the movements as might at first appear. The language of mystery and prophecy appeals to the masses as it corresponds to their loss of place and home and their radical preparedness to be integrated by the forces of fate and supra-individual historical laws. The atomisation of the masses not only undermined the processes of collective confirmation which enhance common sense but it also created the disposition to believe in mysteriousness which was the chief criterion of totalitarian propaganda (OT351). The masses cannot believe in the fortuitous character of reality and are inclined to look for hidden and omnipotent forces. This makes them especially gullible and susceptible to the simplistic totalitarian ideologies that expound theories of worldwide conspiracies of race or class or the inexorable "laws of history". What is convincing in this vision is its very systematicity, consistency and constant repetition (OT351). Having been displaced from the real but chaotic bourgeois lifeworld of this period, the mass individual could only find the sort of security and certainty he/she sought in a simplistic and rigid ideology and the movement which propagated it).

16. To reinforce atomisation as the explanatory key to the modern masses and to emphasize the depth which it had attained in their case Arendt draws a distinction between isolation and loneliness. The former is a condition long known in the history of tyranny that follows from the denial of public space. The individual that suffers such a severance of political contact is excluded from participation in all public forums. Arendt remarks that this result in feelings of frustration and impotence but it does not destroy all human capacities. Loneliness, on the other hand, represents a new pitch of desperation where isolation has also invaded the private sphere. The capacities for experience, fabrication and thought which survived political tyranny in tact are now under threat as loneliness concerns life as a whole and amounts to the experience of not belonging to the world at all (OT474). Of course the complete devastation of private life only reached its culmination in the prison and death camps of the totalitarian regimes, There the experience of not belonging to the world at all was first played out figuratively in a range of personal humiliations and degradations being realised also literally. However, Arendt's most startling conviction is this new intensity of modern alienation has its sources in the far less obvious routines of everyday bourgeois experience and the radical atomisation to be found there. I have already mentioned Arendt's emphatic critique of atomising competition in bourgeois society. At this point she deepens this critique by concentrating on what she views as the dominant form of activity in this society:

In isolation, man remains in contact with the world as a human artifice; only when the most elementary form of human creativity...is destroyed, isolation becomes unbearable. This can happen in a world whose chief values are dictated by labor, that is where all human activities have been transformed into laboring. Under such conditions, only the sheer effort to labor which is the effort to keep alive is left and the relationship with the world as a human artifice is broken. Isolated man who lost his place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no longer recognised as homo faber but treated as an animal laborans whose necessary "metabolism with nature" is of concern to no one. Isolation then becomes loneliness.....(OT475).

Here we begin to enter the conceptual universe of Arendt's The Human Condition (1958) and need to do some preliminary work before we can follow. What is important is that already in the late forties Arendt had established the conceptual link between the loneliness and atomisation of the masses and the form of human activity that she argued was already dominant in modernity. For her, the activity of laboring which she identified solely with the reproduction of life itself and distinguished from the creative work of making, world fabrication and political action now exercised a dangerous hegemony over the self-understanding and aspirations of modernity. Furthermore, the dominance of this activity advanced a mass conformist psychology that was particularly susceptible to totalitarian organisation. 

Saturday, August 22, 2015

Essay Questions for PHIL 2625 Sem 2/2105



Essay Length- 2,000 words

DUE DATE: Mon 26th May

All essays are due [Monday 26th Oct]. Late essays will be accepted up to Mon 9th Oct] without excuse, but marks will be deducted according to the Sophi schedule. Essays will only be accepted after [Mon 10th June] if a satisfactory excuse is submitted. The only satisfactory excuses are illness or misadventure. Pressure of other work, or computer equipment failure, does not normally count as misadventure. All applications for extension should by submitted to Dr Grumley before the due date (John. Grumley@sydney.edu.au). Work can only be submitted through the Turnitit facility.
Note Secondary readings these are not intended to be a substitute for the primary texts. While the secondary material is included to supply orienting and interpretative hints, students are expected to support their answers with interpretation and argument drawn directly from Arendt.

Questions

1.    In OT the concept of the “masses” plays a major diagnostic role. What are the features of this characterization and why does Arendt use this concept? Is this notion still relevant today?

Reading
Arendt, H. Origins of Totalitarianism, HBJ, New York, 1951
___ The Human Condition, Chicago, 1958
Giner, S. Mass Society, Martin Robertson, London, 1976
Passerin D'Entreves, M. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt Routledge, London, 1994, Chapter 1
Canovan, M. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, HBJ, New York, 1974 Chapters 2, 4
Benhabib, S. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, Sage, London, 1996, Chapter 3
Pitkin, H F. The Attack of the Blob Chicago, 1998, Chapters 5, 6, 9, 10
Whitfield, S. Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, Chapters, 3,4
Kateb, G. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil Rowman & Allanheld, New Jersey, 1983, Chapters, 2,4,5
Hansen, P. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship Polity, Cambridge, 1993, Chapters 1, 3, 4
Barnouw, D. Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the German-Jewish Experience John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, Chapters 2, 5, 6
Issacs, J C. Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992, Chapter 2
Issacs, J C. Democracy in Dark Times Cornell University Press, 1998, Chapters 5, 8

2.    Arendt regularly speaks about the essence of totalitarianism. What is this essence and why do you think she uses this terminology?

Reading
Arendt, H. Origins of Totalitarianism HBJ, New York, 1951
Arendt, H. 'On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding’ Essays in Understanding 1930-1954 HBJ, New York, 1994
Voegelin, E. ' The Origins of Totalitarianism' with 'A Reply by Hannah Arendt' The Review of Politics Vol XV, Kraus Reprint Corporation, New York, 1953, pp68-85
Ezorsky, G ‘Hannah Arendt’s View of Totalitarianism and the Holocaust’  Philosophy and the Holocaust” A Special Double Issue The Philosophical Forum A Quarterly Vol XVI, No 1-2, Fall-Winter 1984/5
Castoriadis, C. ' The Destinies of Totalitarianism' Salmagundi No 60, 1983
Canovan, M. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt HBJ, New York, 1974 Chapter 2
Halberstam, M. Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics Yale University Press, 2000, Part Three
Benhabib, S. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt Sage, London, 1996 Chapter 3
Villa, D R. (Ed) The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, 2000, Part 1
Whitfield, S. Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, Chapters, 2,4,6,7
Bernstein, R J. Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, MIT, 1996, Chapter 4
Kateb, G. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil Rowman & Allanheld, New Jersey, 1984, Chapter 2
Hansen, P. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship Polity, Cambridge, 1993, Chapter 4
Barnouw, D. Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the German-Jewish Experience, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990, Chapter 6
Issacs, J C. Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992, Chapter 2
Pinto, António Costa , Kallis, Aristotle (Editors) Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship         in Europe Palgrave, London, 2014


3.    Reconstruct Arendt's account of the inherent tension in the idea of the nation-state? To what extent is this analysis still relevant today?

Reading
Arendt, H. Origins of Totalitarianism HBJ, New York, 1951
Bernstein, R J, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question MIT, 1996, Chapter3
Benhabib, S. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt Sage, 1996 Chapter 3
Owens, Patricia. Between War and Politics: International Relations in the Thought of Hannah Arendt Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 Chapter 4
Goldoni, M.& Mc Corkindale, C.(Ed) Hannah Arendt and the Law Hart Publishing, Portland, Oregon, 2012, Chapter 10
Brubaker, R. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany Harvard University Press, 1992
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities Verso, 1983, Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Hobsbawn, E J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Cambridge University Press, 1990
Greenfeld, L Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity Harvard University Press, 1992
(Other works referred to above for questions 1-3 do discuss the issue in passing)

4.    What is Arendt's critique of the "social sphere" in modernity? Is this critique sustainable today?

Reading
Arendt, H. The Human Condition Chicago University Press, 1958
Passerin D' Entreves, M. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt Routledge, London, 1994, Chapter 1
Benhabib, S. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt Sage, London, 1996, chapter 5
Pitkin, H F. The Attack of the Blob Chicago, 1998, Chapters 5, 6, 9, 12
Wolin, R. ‘Democracy and the Political In the Thought of Hannah Arendt’ Labyrinths Uni of Massachusetts Press, 1995
Honig, B. (Ed) Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt Penn State University, 1995, chapters 1-4
Canovan, M. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt HBJ, New York, 1974, Chapters 3,4
Kateb, G. Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil Rowman &Allanheld, 1984, Chapter5
Hansen, P. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship Polity, Cambridge, 1993, Chapters 2, 3
Gottsegen, M G. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt State University of New York Press, 1994, Chapters 1, 2
Fehér, F. ' Freedom and the Social Question: Hannah Arendt's Theory of the French Revolution' Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol 12 No1, 1987
Bernstein, R J. ' Rethinking the Social and the Political' in Philosophical Profiles Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986

5.    Explain Arendt's notion of the "human condition"? Critically analyse the theoretical motivations behind the introduction of this concept?

Reading
Arendt, H. The Human Condition University of Chicago Press, 1958
Canovan, M. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt HBJ, New York, 1974 Chapter 3
Parekh, S. Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights Routledge, London, 2008, Chapters 2, 3
Gottsegen, M G. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt University of New York Press, Albany, 1994, Chapter 1
Dossa, S. The Public Realm and the Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, Ch 3
Benhabib, S. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt Sage, London, Chapter 6
Villa, D J. (Ed) The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, 2000, Part 3
Isaacs, J C. Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992, Chapter 3
Issacs, J C. ‘The Pathos of Modern Freedom’ Democracy in Dark Times Cornell Uni Press, 1998, Chapter 8
Bowen-Moore, P. Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality MacMillan, London, 1989, Chs 1-3
Frampton K 'The Status of Man and the Status of His Objects: A Reading of The Human Condition 'in Hill M A (Ed) Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World St Martin's Press, London, 1979
Jay, M. 'The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt' in Permanent Exiles Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, Chapter 14
Hansen, P. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship Polity, Cambridge, 1993, Chapters 1-4
Hinchman, L P&SK. 'In Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism' The Review of Politics Vol 46, No2, 184
Roman, J. 'Thinking Politics Without a Philosophy of History' Arendt and Merleau-Ponty Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol 15, No4, 1989

6.    Explain the rationale of Arendt’s hierarchy of human activities in The Human Condition. Is the priority she gives to individual action compatible with the contemporary liberal democracy?

Reading
Arendt, H. The Human Condition Chicago University Press, 1958
Passerin D' Entreves, M. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt Routledge, London, 1994, Chapter 1
Benhabib, S. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt Sage, London, 1996, chapter 5
Pitkin, H F. The Attack of the Blob Chicago, 1998, Chapters 5, 6, 9, 12
Wolin, R. ‘Democracy and the Political In the Thought of Hannah Arendt’ Labyrinths Uni of Massachusetts Press, 1995
Pitkin, H F. 'Are Freedom and Liberty Twins' Political Theory Vol 16 No 4, Nov 1988, 523-552
Stilman, P. ' Freedom as Participation: The Revolutionary Theory of Hegel and Arendt" The American Behavioural Scientist Vol 20 No 4,12977
Hansen, P. Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship Polity, Cambridge, 1993, Chapter 3
Gottsegen, M G. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994, Chapter 1
Tlaba, G M. Politics and Freedom: Human Will and Action in the Thought of Hannah Arendt, University of America Press, New York, 1987
Villa, D J. (Ed) The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, Cambridge University Press, 2000
Isaacs, J C. Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992, Chapter 3
Issacs, J C. ‘The Pathos of Modern Freedom’ Democracy in Dark Times Cornell Uni Press, 1998, Chapter 8
Bowen-Moore, P. Hannah Arendt's Philosophy of Natality MacMillan, London, 1989, Chs1-3


7.    Explain Arendt’s idea of the paradox of human rights. What is her attitude to this paradox and what does her account offer us in terms of a contemporary solution.

Reading
Arendt, H. Origins of Totalitarianism HBJ, New York, 1951, chapter 6, 9.
Arendt, H. ‘The Rights of Man” What are They? Modern Review Summer, 1949, New York pp.24-37
Parekh, S. Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights Routledge, London, 2008, chapters 1, 5, 6
Birmingham, P. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights Indiana University Press, 2006
Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens Cambridge University Press, 2004, chapter 2
Clapham, A. Human Rights in the Private Sphere Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993
Owens, Patrica. Between War and Politics: International Relations in the Thought of Hannah Arendt Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007
Donnelly, J. Universal Rights in Theory and Practice Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989
Canovan, M. Hannah Arendt A Reinterpretation of Her Political Theory Cambridge University Press, 1992, chapter 5
Bernstein, R. Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question MIT, 1996
chapter 3
Curtis, K. Our Sense of the Real. Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics, Cornell University Press, 1999, chapter 1
Passerin D’Entreves, M. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt Routledge, London, 1994, chapter 4
Isaac, J C. Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, chapter 3
Isaacs, J C. Democracy in Dark Times Cornell University Press, 1998, Chapter 4


Wednesday, August 19, 2015

Lecture 2 (cont) & Lecture 3: Origins of Totalitarianism

  7. One response to this analysis might be to say that Arendt's diagnosis was too “close” to events, she was too pessimistic and had not yet achieved the required critical distance that might provide a more balanced view of the potentials of modernity. The next fifty years brought relative peace and economic prosperity in most Western liberal-democratic societies, a social stability and inclusiveness that and might allow us to be more sanguine. Despite a new outbreak of economic problems, the nuclear threat has receded in the decade after Arendt’s death, the Communist block largely collapsed and international and national political structures have proved more resilient than she initially expected. The prospects of democracy-- always fragile and under pressure-- in many parts of the world formerly ruled by authoritarian regimes now seem more promising, although also everywhere facing significant historical challenges. Yet, it now seems Arendt’s concern (it is interesting to note in her correspondence that her experience of Fascism had left an indelible mark of always expecting that a disaster may be just about to engulf her) seems very justified in the light of recent events. She was correct in believing that we cannot foresee a return to a world of stability and security. For those living in liberal democratic countries the burden of our times may not be concerns about immediate physical survival but uncertainty and insecurity is in a sense even more pervasive. Arendt's critique still strikes a chord in us. Those who live in the first world live in a society whose fundamental orientation has become work and consumption. Bureaucratic and economic steering mechanisms operate almost automatically seemingly beyond human control. The life world is now exposed to regular systematic transformation and constant flux. The fate of millions depends upon rapidly changing economic and political conditions that now includes the prospect of mass terror against large civilian populations, of catastrophe economic breakdown or irreversible climate change. Traditional cultural vocabularies and political allegiances are under great stress and the shape of future is in some respects less clear than in Arendt's time. We witness an increasingly widespread questioning of the legitimacy of existing political structures reflected in shrinking voter turnouts and disenchantment with major parties and their capacities to deliver in the interests of the community as a whole. We can neither dismiss her claim for the crisis character of modernity nor can we easily ignore her caution. Her view of modern society is neither one-dimensional nor totally pessimistic. She views modernity dialectically: she analyses both strengths and weaknesses, good and evil and their apparent inter-dependence. Arendt sees not just the increasing polarisation of “civilisation”, with one face, increasingly powerful in terms of human mastery over nature and potential omnipotence, and, with the other, with the increasing powerlessness and dependence of vast populations. She understands the deep paradoxes of this situation: the inextricable interweaving of good and evil. Thus she notes that without the imperialist drive for expansion and the bourgeois political device of "power for power sake" we might never have realised the ideal of humanity nor recognised the extent of human strength. Arendt vision of modernity is not a product of hopelessness or despair but of justified apprehension and great caution arising from the experience of totalitarianism. Having seen all the potentialities both for good and radical evil the modern world had to offer, she was not about to underestimate those aspects of modern life that assaulted human dignity and rendered the modern individual atomised, conformist and dehumanised. For her, a complete lack of sentimentality was the pre-condition for allowing contemporaries to understand these increasingly harsh and inconstant realities, to face up to them and resist them when necessary.

Lecture 3: The Origins of Totalitarianism


1. The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) is Arendt’s attempt to provide an interpretation of the horrendous experience she shared with millions of others in the epoch following the First World War. This book can justifiably be called the Origins of Totalitarianism. She argues that totalitarianism is an invention of modernity: in historical terms an entirely novel political form. It is not a necessary consequence of modernity but its darkest potential, a potential immanent to the hidden underlying tendencies and mechanisms that dissolved the spiritual and political world of the past and generated the present crisis situation. Arendt's first major work is a "problematic" work. However, the problem lies not so much where commentators originally found it: in the conflation of both the Nazi and Stalinist regimes as a single phenomena called "totalitarianism". Critics pointed out that the discussion of Stalin's regime seems to be no more than an afterthought. It comes only 300 pages into the book. There is virtually no analysis of its historical background. Nor does it lie in Arendt's idiosyncratic mixture of historical narrative, political science, sociology, literary criticism, biography, history of ideas and epochal diagnosis. These, I think, are part of the pleasure of reading her but also they are consistent with her methodological desire not to provide an exhaustive explanation in terms of historical necessities that expunged the elements of individual actions and choice.

2. The real problem is Arendt's sheer ambition and the very complicated weaving together of all the elements that she believed coalesced into this epoch as radical evil. This means that there is great difficulty in tracing the arguments and holding the separate parts of this panoramic vision together in a coherent picture. Yet, the complexity of this narrative is not only structurally important, it is also vital to the book. This is a substantive dimension of Arendt's very understanding of history. She rejects the very idea that there could be some general or simple key to historical understanding like "class" or "race". This is the shortcoming of “ideological” thinking which tries to explain everything from a single premise, which follows the logic of ideas as if the course of historical events were the same as the unfolding logic of ideas and therefore it would be conceivable to know the whole of the process (OT469). For Arendt, history is a complex constellation not only of supra-individual processes but of individual actions, choices and singular events: these are contingent, unpredictable and irreversible. This is why her portrait of great historical processes is dotted with so many excursions into detailed individual episodes revealing individual heroism, greed, moral failure and individual responsibility. It is not surprising to find that her explanation of "totalitarianism" is not simple but a very rich fabric of interwoven elements, of light and shade and historical openness. This is also indicative of the fact that, for her, the 20th century had not yet heard the end of the story.

3. The Origins is structured in three parts 1) Anti-Semitism. 2) Imperialism. 3) Totalitarianism. Arendt's analysis departs from the Holocaust. From the start she moves this event from the periphery into the very centre. This mass liquidation of a population was the exemplification of the radical evil of modernity: an unprecedented moral outrage which defying not only all traditional moral canons but even the more instrumental ideas of modern political or economic rationality. This historical unprecedented quality is the basis for her characterisation of modernity as a completely new historical constellation. She refuses to accept the standard simplistic explanations:
a.   The Jews either as merely innocent scapegoats (a vulnerable minority that was sufficiently different and weak to attract the displaced frustration and blame for all the ills of the world)
b.   As victims of seemingly eternal Anti-Semitism that has been around for over two thousand years.
In Arendt’s view these pseudo-explanations are not even close to adequate: neither really deals with the historical facts, allows for the possibility of real historical action, nor provides an account of specific Jewish responsibility in the events that produced the final tragedy.

4. Arendt finds the key to understanding the historical genesis of this otherwise inexplicable policy in the curious historical coincidence of Anti-Semitism and the collapse of nationalism. On closer inspection, this historical intersection is no coincidence at all. The linkage between these two phenomena allows an explanation of how a marginalised and ostracised race could be drawn into the very centre of a catastrophe that destroyed both them and most of Europe.

5. Part one -Anti-Semitism- is devoted to the fascinating history of the Western European Jewry in modern times. Arendt concentrates on the diplomatic and financial services they provided for the princes of the newly emerging nation states. The Western European Jews were a stateless people with strong inter-European family and financial connections. They provided indispensable financial services to the newly emerging princely nation-states. These had been unable to attract the bourgeoisie who viewed such state investment as unproductive. In return, the Jews received the special privileges and the protection of the state. However, this alliance between the Jews and the princely nation state was quite instrumental and provisional. It wanes towards the end the 19th century when the national bourgeoisie, faced with the difficulty of surplus unproductive capital and saturated domestic markets, begin to clamour for state support towards colonial ventures and became more politically and economically active in state business. The financial importance of the Jews diminishes as growing nationalism and imperialist competition changed the character of foreign policy. The old scenario of a balance of power and quest for peace in which Jewish inter-European connections sometimes played a crucial diplomatic role is replaced by a policy of "victory or death" (OT21). Both in the areas of state financing and diplomacy the wealthy Jews confronted an increasing loss of functionality. This loss was aggravated by marginalised social position of Jews in a bourgeois society increasingly defined in terms of classes. In the context of heightened class struggle, the Jews were perceived as a self-preserving marginal group defined only by wealth and ethnicity. They enjoyed special protection and a status within the state and its machinery. In the environment of intensified class conflict and increased class casualties as the crisis of bourgeois society deepened, every class which came into conflict with the new bourgeois state eventually also became Anti-Semitic. Arendt underlines the political dangers of this political naïveté and purely defensive policy of the wealthy Western Jews. For them Anti-Semitism was a problem that could be displaced as long as they enjoyed privileges and distinguished themselves from their teeming eastern brethren. They had tied their fate to the fortunes of the nation-state. When the European nation-state system began to collapse under the internal pressures of modernising dynamics, they found themselves at the centre of the storm. Arendt's main point is that traditional anti-Semitism did not acquire political relevance in the C20th until it breached the domain of social prejudice and combined with either major political issues or where Jewish interests clashed with that of other major classes of society (OT28).

 

1. From the standpoint of a diagnosis of modernity, the heart of Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism is the second part on Imperialism. Here she connects her initial themes of Anti-Semitism and Jewish history to the fundamental dynamics-- bourgeoisification, imperialism, bureaucracy and radical nationalism—which threw the old political and economic institutions of Europe into utter crisis. For Arendt, the impact of imperialism on the nation state is the central dynamic. Imperialism represents a qualitative new phase in the evolution of the bourgeois economy. Hitherto, the bourgeoisie had been essentially an apolitical class. Its philosophy of life was orientated to ruthless competition and individual success and this produced apathy to public life and a belief that the duties of a citizen could only be a drain (OT313). However, internal developments in the bourgeois economy transform the bourgeois attitude to politics and generated a bourgeois will bent on a political takeover of the state. Imperialism was born when the ruling bourgeois class came up against the national limits to economic expansion. In the early decades of the 19th century, the potent combination of the newly emancipated market and industrialisation initially allowed very rapid capital accumulation. By the last quarter, the very success of the bourgeois industrial revolution had led to a peculiar kind of economic crisis: this was surplus money, of over-saving and a lack of prospects for productive investment within national boundaries. The bourgeois industrial revolution provided both the technological and productive means and eventually economic necessity also generated the will to expand beyond the territorial bounds of the nation-state. National governments were compelled by domestic economic pressures to adopt a more aggressive and activist foreign policy. A series of disastrous economic collapses of offshore companies involving thousands of small investors reinforced the recognition that foreign investors in search of profit needed protection. Unless the large European nation-states were prepared to project their political power beyond their own home territory, uncontrolled foreign investment appeared as too great a gamble.
2. Imperialist expansion could not be justified on the grounds of traditional nationalism. The modern Western nation-state was built on the active consent on a homogeneous population. Western nationalism was formed on the trinity of people-territory-state. Nationalism sprung from the identity of such a population forged variously by some combination of language, religion and ethnicity with a territory. In as much as the nation-state emerged as an institutional-legal structure, its laws were viewed as an expression of the people's will. Effective political power could not expand beyond the limits that would strain such consent. Genuine consent can neither be stretched indefinitely nor won from conquered peoples. The existence of significant territorial domains beyond the immediate province of effective consent, created dangerous prospects of abuse and experiments in state power. Every large European nation entered world politics in the course of the 19th century. Only a few recognised the potentially destructive consequences of imperialism for the national political body. Yet these voices had no political impact in the face of bourgeois Realpolitik.

3. Here Arendt reveals the beginnings of some key ideas central to her subsequent critique of liberalism and the rise of an emancipated social sphere. Competition and expansion are economic not political principles. (OT125). Capitalist accumulation, based on the productivity of man, has no inherent limits and must be controlled and restrained by political power (OT126). The human capacity for increased production is potentially unlimited and the workings of the bourgeois market make such expansion a driving necessity. A fundamental tension exists between the economic dynamic of bourgeois society and its underlying political framework and principals. Arendt regards "expansion" and "competition" as economic concepts that are unique to the political vocabulary of modernity. They derive not from politics or but from the economic sphere which was liberated in the 19th century. The translation of such concepts into the political realm was bound to produce dysfunctional tensions and strains.

4. A crucial element of Arendt's vision of modernity is the boundlessness of production as it escapes the confines of the household in early modernity. Production in the sense of domestic reproduction of the necessities of life is immured in an eternal circle as a process without end. The relocation of this process within the bourgeois context of capital accumulation and with the productive means provided by industrial technology was a recipe for surplus. Accumulation leads to expansion and finally to saturation. The bourgeois and industrial revolutions of the early decades of the 19th century generated not only wealth, rising living standards, rapid technological improvement but also social dislocation, competition, crisis and unemployment: in short, the surpluses both of capital and people spoken of earlier. In Arendt’s view, the imperialist drive was generated by this internal dynamic of the modern bourgeois society towards the end of the 19th century. Surplus capital in search of productive employment and surplus people resulting from increased population and the periodic unemployment crises of the market cycle. Arendt accepts that these surpluses were both a product of competition, the intensified class conflict of bourgeois society and a threat to the cohesion of the nation. Imperialism promised a solution to the problem of surplus by providing an arena of permanent expansion. By finding a home for surplus capital and surplus people it not only displaced and delayed the crisis of bourgeois society but it also provided a symbol of national unity in a climate of intensified class struggles (OT152). Yet, the political structures of bourgeois society which evolved in the early part of the 19th century-- the nation-state, civil service, parliamentary and party systems--were not infinitely elastic and came under great stress as domestic economic and social conditions deteriorated. In reality, imperialism allowed only a respite in the last quarter of the century and, in so doing, also aggravated the problem by generating the competitive international environment that culminated in World War. The consequence of this was not just the massive costs in human lives and post-war reconstruction but an even greater crisis of the bourgeois nation state. Forces were let loose which finally overturned the delicate balance of the national-state in favour of the self-assertion of nation both externally and internally against the traditional legality and egalitarian citizenship of the state. This was the result of increasing bourgeois political hegemony during the course of the 19th century and the increasing sway of economic imperatives in setting the political agenda. The increasing economic difficulties of bourgeois society meant the economic ruin of broader social strata. Not just the traditional "rabble" and unemployed workers but also large segments of the middle class. They no longer found a voice in the political status quo of antagonistic parties and nation state.

5. How does Arendt understand the 19th century class articulation of politics? Unlike Marx, she stresses the way in which these new economic groupings substituted for the now rapidly disappearing organic communities. While not as naturally determined as the orders and estates of Feudal society, membership in a class was generally by birth. Individuals still largely inherited their manners, taste, outlook and interests from their class position. This provided them with a sense of identity, solidarity and shared world in an increasingly dynamic and unstable lifeworld. She down plays the degree to which social organisation by class represented a complete break with the Feudal past based on estates. She maintains that as each class rose to greater prominence in the society this rise was always accompanied by the education and training of a certain number of its members as its political representatives (OT314). The role of class representatives was to express and advance the collective interests of the class defined in terms of their common position, shared aspirations and group identity. Class politics effectively promoted primarily sectional interest and required only limited group obligations and traditional passive attitudes towards government without individuals feeling personally responsible. This sense of passivity is intensified for the great passive majority. It remained outside all party and other political organisations. Arendt's main point is that class politics was always the politics of elites. This party system of class politics operated both on the Continent and in Britain. That the great majority of individuals in class society remained passive and indifferent to politics did not seem to matter as long as the class system and its representative political articulation appeared to be taking care of the interests of those not explicitly politically engaged. The party was the political expression of the collective interests of particular classes: it endeavoured to articulate this interest in the form of an ideology that claimed that these particular interests coincided with the general interests of the community. As the class conflict of 19th century bourgeois society intensified, the gap between the ideological rhetoric of the party with its claim to be the embodiment of general interests and the reality of its particularist and sectional interests provoked widespread distrust (OT251). Increasingly, substantial minorities felt themselves ignored in this system and were therefore susceptible to mobilisation by extra-parliamentary forces.

6. Arendt makes some important political points by comparing the contrasting fates of these political/party systems in Britain and the Continent. How are we to explain the enduring stability of British political institutions and the contemporaneous decline of the nation state in Europe? Arendt focuses on the distinctive way in which the party functioned within the body politic in each system. In the large European states, government was conceived as above the parties. The parties were defined as parts of a whole and the latter was represented by the state above parties. Thus the continental multi-parties were in principle separated from government and could never aspire to take charge of government. At this time, cabinets were appointed to advise government. Party members as advocates of special interests never governed in their own right. This tended to confine the parties to the sphere of particular interest and identify the parties with private antagonisms. Their practical role became the protection of private interests from the interference of public authority. This was why the division between citizen and bourgeois was so stark in the Continental system and men were recognised as citizens only in so far as they were not party members. For the parties, distance from government also diluted competence and responsibility while, for the citizens, government was made an alien mystery (OT254-5). The weakness and potential dangers of this arrangement are evident in comparison to the British system. There the dominant party was temporarily identical to the state whereas the other major party was as an alternative government never far from power and state. The proximity of state and power consolidated the need for competence and responsibility. The state is not some lofty entity far beyond reach but within the grasp of citizens organised in the party. This is decisive for Arendt. The Continental system promoted an organisation of private individuals who never reached the thresh hold of common action (OT254). The British arrangement promoted organisation amongst citizens towards common views and programmes. This was the condition of attaining government and therefore of any action at all.
 

Thursday, August 6, 2015

Lecture 2: Arendt's Early Philosophical Orientation



 

1. Last week I ended by indicating some biographical details from Arendt's life. You will remember that she was a student of classical German philosophy who came to political philosophy almost by accident. This accident was the political triumph of National Socialism and the almost immediate beginnings of the policy that was to lead to the Holocaust and the destruction of Europe. Arendt's turn to political philosophy or political theory in this context might seem almost self-explanatory. However, a more precise understanding of her motives is illuminating. When Arendt fled Germany she lived for several years in Paris working practically for Zionist organisations. This dramatic shift from the life of the mind to the active life was not merely the result of being a stateless person in a foreign country without connections and certification but a conscious choice. In a later interview Arendt explained that this career change had two fundamental motives. The positive one was the political realisation that being attacked as a Jew left her no alternative but to defend herself not as a German or World citizen or as the upholder of human rights but simply as a Jew. Initially her interest in the Jewish question had been a personal issue expressed in the work on Rahel Varnhagen which follows the efforts of a Jewish women in the age of Enlightenment trying to come to terms with her own historical fate and its pervasive anti-Semitism. Now it became political and she felt the need to defend herself as a Jew aligned to an organisation. The negative motive in this decision was the disgust she felt at the typical behaviour of intellectuals after the Nazis take-over. The intellectual circles in which Arendt had lived capitulated almost voluntarily to the Nazis policy of co-ordination (Gleichschaltung) to secure positions and employment. She did not so much blame German intellectuals for this collective lack of courage (which is surprising) but attributed responsibility to the "intellectual business" itself. We have noted that Arendt had been reluctant to become a professor later when the opportunity arose in the United States. This is partly explicable in terms of this earlier experience that there was something deeply problematic about a life exclusively devoted to intellectualism. She explains Heidegger’s own personal attraction to Fascism in these terms. Being alone is the professional deformation of the true thinker and this can often induce a partiality for tyranny. As we will see, she becomes a fierce opponent of the classical attempt to appropriate politics for episteme.

2. While Arendt may have abandoned academia after her experience in Germany, it would be wrong to say that her classical philosophical education ceased to impact on the way she viewed the world. Her identification with her own Jewishness eventually gave shape to a self-understanding that aligned her to a Jewish intellectual tradition that she designated the "conscious pariah". This tradition, which she associated particularly with the names of Heine, Bernard Lazare, and Kafka, was characterised by political rebellion against its own exclusion. Lazare was a journalist who defended the Jewish officer Dreyfus in the famous treason in France at the end of the 19th Century that had exposed the depth of French anti-semitism. He had opposed the Zionist movement in the early decades of the 20th century on the grounds that it patronised the ordinary Jews by excluding them from the councils of policy, while the wealthy Jews were able to exchange their money for political control of the community. For Arendt, Lazare’s preparedness to be a pariah in his own community made him a hero: he did not believe the Jews could save themselves by withdrawing from the rest of the world and separating themselves from the oppression of others. This orientation made a major combative contribution to the constitutive features of the pariah tradition: innocence, natural freedom, aloofness, fancy and utopianism. These other qualities were the need for struggle, to face the real world and assume a sense of responsibility for what the world has done to them. This identification aided the orientations of Arendt's own critical attitude and consciously marginal standpoint: the strange mixture of uncompromising realism, flights of classical fancy and love for the world. However, it was her immediate philosophical tutors--Heidegger and Jaspers-- to whom she turned to give shape to her diagnosis of the contemporary world and it is in a theoretical dialogue with them that she begins to fashion her own distinctive standpoint.

3. One of the few places that this dialogue become explicit is the early 1944 article-- ‘What is Existenz Philosophy?’--that attempts to explain to her new US audience the contours of German Existenz Philosophy. This little summary of the historical antecedents of contemporary existentialism presents Arendt's version of the crisis of modern self-understanding and the relative merits of Heidegger and Jaspers in meeting the abyss revealed by it. For Arendt, it is Kant who is the father of modern philosophy. It was he who shattered the classical unity of thought and being. Before Kant, it was presupposed that "everything thinkable also existed and everything extant, because it was knowable, also had to be rational" (Essays in U, P168). Kant's critical philosophy disturbed this ancient security of being as a being at home in the world, as the harmonious fit between rational categories and the structure of the cosmos. Kant argued that any proposition making a statement about reality reaches beyond the concept of any given thing. Furthermore, Kant's rejection of the ontological proof for the existence of God (that anything accessible to reason had to exist) results in the abandonment of the modern individual to a godless world with nothing more than his/her own autonomy. For Arendt, modern philosophy departs from the interpretation of this ostensibly abandoned individual. The term "which first appears in its modern sense in the work of the late Schelling refers to the pure "thatness" of arbitrary existence. Universalising reason supplies us with a "what" without qualities: the emptiness and colourlessness of this "what" only underlines the utter contingency of existence. The objective truths of science leave us helpless because they cannot solve the problem of existence, of our own individual meaning. This recognition is the force behind Kierkegaard's revolt against Hegel. His system presumed to comprehend and explain the whole of reality. For Kierkegaard, the existence of the individual is neither thinkable nor foreseen by reason. This protest of modern irrationalism puts on the philosophical agenda a whole new set of themes hitherto neglected by rationalism: death, contingency and guilt.

4. Yet, if Arendt views Kant as the father of modern philosophy, he is also its hero. He may have left us a world that was hard to live in but, Arendt reminds us, this critical destruction of the ancient concept of being was all in the cause of establishing the autonomy of man. At the centre of Kantian practical philosophy are the concepts of human freedom and dignity. He underlines the uniqueness of man in the context of being. Freedom is an indispensable regulative idea of our ethical existence and contends that every human is an end in him/herself. On the basis of his good will man has the possibility to determine his own actions: he finally comes of age, declaring his autonomy as the master and measure of himself. However, the other side of Kant, his famous dualism, is the constriction of this freedom and dignity to the noumenal world of the subject, to the world of ideas. Once a human desire is translated from the interior domain of intentions into the objective world it is captive to alien forces: to the laws of causality that are quite indifferent to, and destructive of, human freedom. In the final analysis, Kant leaves human beings with an unfree freedom. This condition is exemplified by the antinomies that plague theoretical reason like freedom and necessity. Arendt maintains that the story of modern philosophy is its preoccupation and struggle with this paradoxical legacy. The greatest modern philosophers defiantly set out to affirm human freedom and challenge the dominance of an alien natural world only to beat a final retreat back to the safety of the old concept of being dressed in many new disguises. Arendt mentions Marx's recognition of necessity, Nietzsche's amour fati, Heidegger's resoluteness. Kant’s greatness, according to Arendt, lies in the fact that no one after him, with the possible exception of Jaspers, had been able to go beyond him. None of these greats could live up to Kant’s fundamental concepts of human freedom and dignity.

5. We do not have the time to delve further into Arendt's analysis of Existenz philosophy. However, in this article she views Jasper's as the most promising research programme. This is undoubtedly connected to Heidegger’s affiliation with Nazism. Jaspers, on the other hand, follows Kant in affirming the dignity and freedom of all men against Heidegger’s preoccupation with self-ness. Here Arendt's humanist credentials are stated very strongly. "Since Kant the essence of man consisted in every single human being representing all of humanity" (Essays in U, P181) in the sense that all rational being have in principle equal access to apprehension of the moral law. This is opposed by Heidegger who deliberate abandons the concept of man with its alleged aspirations to mastery and its phenomenologically unverifiable characteristics of freedom, dignity and reason in favour of Dasein (the Being of man)which emphasizes the singularity, the conditionedness and the contingency of the self. Arendt make the point that this concept of self "is a concept of man that leaves the individual existing independent of humanity and representative of no one but himself--of nothing but his own nothingness" (Essays in U, P181). This unambiguous preference for Jaspers over Heidegger clearly lies in his humanist Kantian rehabilitation of freedom. This assumes the shape of a concept of existence that “is not a form of being but a form of human freedom”, a form in which" man as potential spontaneity rejects the conception of himself as mere result"'(Essays in U, P183). This affirmation of freedom, grounded in the human condition of natality, remains central to Arendt’s mature thought. While she always thought Heidegger the greater philosopher, what Arendt really found great in Jaspers was his moral personality and the living dialogue she was able to carry on with him. The preference she shows for Jasper’s philosophical attitude at this time is, however, more than a concession to his moral personality. It signifies her evaluation of the importance of a humanist philosophical programme stressing human freedom, dignity and plurality. This also explains her own ambivalences towards her philosophical inheritance and the fact that she did not immediately return to philosophy proper after the Second World War. For her, the great concerns of Existenz philosophy-- individual death, chance and guilt-- had been simply overwhelmed by an unspeakably brutal collective fate of the Holocaust and the need to unravel its real meaning and the challenge of totalitarianism for the future of mankind.

6. The act of historical understanding is always difficult. Our capacity for empathy seems limited and is often defeated by the mind of the alien other. Yet the difficulties facing understanding are reduced when the other person is a contemporary (at least for some of us). Arendt is more a contemporary than most philosophers you will study but she experienced a world and horrors that thankfully are beyond the experience of most of us. Until recently we could have only read about them, they exhaust our imagination, and in so doing, lose their potency. Arendt in correspondence with Jaspers who, married to Jewess, was dismissed from his chair in the late thirties and lived the rest of the war in what he called internal immigration, writes of them as being survivors of the historical "flood" with all its biblical connotations. This is the lived experience of surviving unprecedented historical events. Of being a Jew in the period of European fascism, World War, the Holocaust, of confrontation with a form of evil so historically unparalleled that Arendt thought it even challenged the capacity of traditional moral categories to render it meaningful. This is Arendt's point of departure in an attempt to make sense of her world. In England The Origins of Totalitarianism was initially published as The Burden of our Time. This title captures the spirit that pervades Arendt's first major and probably her greatest book. She believed that these historical events were unlike any natural catastrophe. There was no possibility of the survivors returning to normal lives and somehow forgetting the horror. For Arendt, the Holocaust is a singular "burden" simply because it could not be left behind. Her very forceful and controversial argument is that these events were no historical aberration or mere accident but the result of "hidden mechanisms" deeply immanent to the dynamics of modernity. There is now no prospect of ever returning to a historical epoch of relative security and calm. The experience of the first half of the 20th century culminating in the threat of nuclear annihilation registers a complete break with the past and a crisis of the fundamental traditions and institutional structures of western civilisation. If this sense of historical rupture was not enough, the idea of the "burden of the times" also has a compelling personal dimension for Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Many were tormented by the question of their own survival when all family, friends and even whole communities had been systematically liquidated. Others felt themselves under the sway of a special responsibility to make something of their lives not personally but on behalf of all those who were murdered. Survival on such terms imposes it own burdens. The Origins of Totalitarianism may be conceived as Arendt's own personal attempt to discharge the burdensome debt of her own survival in the face of the annihilation of millions of others.